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Traditionally, design is viewed as conforming to Simon’s (1960; 1973; 1981) model of problem-
solving, in which intelligence about the problem is gathered, alternatives are evaluated, and a 
solution is chosen and acted upon. But the persistence of this model of the design process 
imposes serious constraints on how we manage design. These constraints are discussed here, to 
understand how we may manage design more effectively if we view it as a multi-layered process. 
Design As Goal-Directed Problem-Solving 
Simon’s (1960; 1973; 1981) model views design as goal-directed, individual problem-solving, in 
the sense that the designer aims to achieve solution-goals that are well-defined at the start of the 
process (Checkland and Holwell, 1998). Individuals structure a mental model of the problem-
situation, to provide sub-goals that guide the decomposition and exploration of various problem-
elements (Simon, 1981; Vera and Simon, 1993). Yet empirical studies of designers do not 
demonstrate such guided behavior. Organizational design goals and the structures associated 
with complex organizational problems and solutions appear highly subjective and subject to 
negotiation, rather than analysis, especially in situations, that require knowledge integration 
across multiple organizational groups (Checkland and Holwell, 1998; Markus et al., 2002; Walz 
et al., 1993). Organizational problems may be categorized as “wicked problems” (Rittel, 1972; 
Rittel and Webber, 1973). These are complex, interrelated, and subjective, with no definable 
solution rules. Problem boundary and definition are jointly constructed and negotiated, through 
argumentation between design participants and through an increasing familiarity with the design 
context (Rittel, 1972). Goals emerge through the process of design. The critical problem of 
design becomes one of distinguishing the significant from the insignificant (Turner, 1987).  
Goal emergence can be seen in empirical studies of experienced software engineers. Rather than 
analyzing design problems according to a set of predetermined goals, designers appear to pursue 
a variety of sub-goals that emerge through the process of design. Such strategies have been 
described as “opportunistic”, as they do not appear to follow a guided, decompositional strategy 
(Guindon, 1990; Khushalani et al., 1994). But such strategies may be considered exploratory, 
rather than opportunistic. Experienced designers extrapolate solutions from similar problems that 
they have encountered previously, incorporating implicit knowledge and implied requirements 
into the framing of new solutions (Curtis et al., 1988; Malhotra et al., 1980; Walz et al., 1993). If 
there are no available solutions to the problem as defined, the problem may be reframed to fit 
available solutions (Malhotra et al., 1980; Urquhart, 2001). A software designer’s representation 
of the design problem and the way in which they structure the software solution appear to co-
evolve, until these merge to provide a target system design (Dorst and Cross, 2001; Maher and 
Poon, 1996). Thus, design appears to be driven by improvisation, indicating contingent, situated 
action (Suchman, 1987). The salient question becomes one of how we determine a “stopping 
rule” for this process of convergence between the problem-space and the solution-space. In the 
traditional model, the stopping-point is determined by the satisfaction of predetermined goals. If 
both solution and problem are redefined through the process of design exploration, how do we 
know when to stop? My own studies indicate that a critical part of group design is how we 
provide a group “mirror” in which an individual’s understanding of design problems and 
solutions may be reflected and bounced around (critiqued). In my studies, design representations 
provided inadequate as a group mirror, as these captured only one level of decomposition, while 
design participants cycled between different levels of abstraction to understand an element of the 
design problem. I identified multiple decompositional levels that needed to be captured, to record 
the totality of design discussions: process definition (abstraction), proposed solution, work-
exemplar, failure or success rationale, information requirements, work-outputs, process goals, 
process dependencies, process mechanisms, and responsibility-allocation. A failure to record 
these elements often lead to the group revisiting the same problems and issues repeatedly. But a 
formal process of modeling all aspects of the design rationale (Moran and Carroll, 1996) would 
have been inappropriate, as the design evolved so rapidly and these aspects often changed as the 
design became better understood. Instead, the group agreed that they could have usefully 
employed a “drill-down” modeling tool, where various levels of design-elements that had proven 
contentious could be recorded. 
Design As Collaborative Action 
Information system design typically takes place in groups, or in interaction with other 
organizational actors. In managing the design process according to Simon’s model of individual 
cognition, we assume shared understanding, which is far from the reality of collaborative design 
(Flor and Hutchins, 1991; Walz et al., 1993). Various design participants view the problem from 
multiple perspectives and worldviews (Checkland and Holwell, 1998). To produce a joint design, 
the members of a collaborative group must first realize that they define design problems and 
potential solutions in different, partial and non-congruent ways. This is not always obvious to 
members of a design group, especially when they derive from different disciplines (knowledge 
domains). So how does a collaborative group understand a design problem? A study of 
architectural design suggests that design framing in groups may be driven by the early definition 
of a "primary generator" concept (Darke, 1979): an exemplar for the form that a design will take, 
that permits designers to articulate goals and requirements for the design, in conversation with 
others. This would indicate a model for IS design that is very different from that for the goal-
directed design of IT systems. In my own studies of the co-design of business and IT systems, I 
found that the group design process was driven by three levels of exemplar. At the highest level, 
a very high-level model of the system solution (a six-stage model of the target business-process) 
guided the process and did not change over the course of the design. At the next level, the design 
process was guided by a series of “mobilizing visions”, that provided a structuring mechanism 
for analysis of the design problem over several weeks or months, until it proved insufficient to 
reflect newly-emergent understandings. It was then replaced by a new mobilizing vision, that 
included some aspects of the previous structure, but also included new aspects. For example, a 
mobilizing vision that structured the problem around the need for an Electronic Document 
Library was replaced by the mobilizing vision that structured the problem around the concept of 
a Virtual Bid-Management Team. But elements of the electronic library persisted in the way that 
the virtual team operation was defined. At the next level, group debate cycled between the 
discussion of suitable exemplars for the design, taken from existing organizational procedures, 
and solution-abstractions for the new system, based on process-generalizations of multiple 
exemplars. An increasing pattern of conflicts appeared to indicate that the mobilizing vision was 
proving inadequate as a way of matching individual solution-spaces to the group problem-space. 
It was at these points that the mobilizing vision tended to be replaced. This mechanism provided 
the group “mirror” discussed in the previous section, against which individual understanding was 
tested. Thus, an interrelated set of exemplars may guide design at different levels. 
The distribution of design knowledge across participating actors is uneven, as actors from 
various knowledge-domains are sensitized to information that is most relevant to their own 
domain. Understanding within a collaborative group is distributed, or “stretched across” a set of 
individuals (Star, 1988). Collective understanding may be mediated by “boundary objects”, such 
as maps and diagrammatic models, (Star, 1989). Boundary objects are incomplete, as they have 
to be sufficiently vague to represent different things to different people. External representations, 
such as design models, often contain a shared understanding that is not possessed individually by 
the people who produced them (Hutchins, 1991; Weick and Roberts, 1993). So the resulting 
knowledge is nomothetic (reduced and generalizable), rather than ideographic (specific to an 
individual knowledge-domain and context). Because of this, design representations do not 
provide a good basis for judging when the design is complete. Much of the design knowledge 
required to make this judgment is in the heads of individuals. Thus, we have the collective 
stopping-rule problem: how does a design group determine that the design is complete, when 
knowledge about the design is distributed between individuals and design artifacts? In my own 
studies, I have encountered some clues to the “stopping rule” problem at a group level.  It would 
appear that the group determines that the design is complete when three conditions are met: (i) 
that the design problem can be sufficiently well-defined that its constituent sub-problem areas 
can be bounded, delineated and assigned to a specific group member, (ii) that individual group 
members are confident that they have a complete solution for a specific sub-problem, and (iii) 
that group members trust that they share a similar worldview to the extent that they can trust 
other group members to resolve a sub-problem area without further input from the group. When 
all three conditions are met, this appears to permit the cognitive division of labor necessary for 
the design to be considered complete. In this sense, the group “stopping rule” appears to be 
associated with the establishment of the design group as a coherent community of professional 
practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991). 
Design As Contextually-Situated Action 
Simon’s (1973) description of bounded rationality views the design process as one of cognitively 
structuring and then decomposing a design-problem, to obtain solution requirements. But in 
Simon’s description of this process, the structure pertains to the problem, not to the analyst. Yet, 
as Weick (2004) argues, a designer is thrown into a situation that is full of pre-existing 
interpretations of the problem and its context. Information system design project groups 
constitute a technology-centered community of practice, that coexists with other organizational 
groups, each of which has different and often competing worldviews (Brown and Duguid, 1994). 
Through the discourse and practices that constitute work, communities of practice create and 
improvise their local reality (Suchman, 1998). To uncover these interpretations – their own and 
those of others -- experienced designers engage in a process of argumentation, with users, 
stakeholders and each other (Rittel, 1972), or with “the situation” (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; 
Weick, 2004). Wicked problems are interrelated, subjective and have no stopping-rule (Rittel, 
1972). Thus, a critical part of the design process must be to bound and define an appropriate 
problem, from an organizational perspective. This involves negotiation across a much wider set 
of stakeholders than from the group perspective. Additionally, the definition of a consensus point 
at which the design can be considered complete also involves political negotiation, as the 
problem-definition emerges through the process of design (Weick, 2004). Thus, we have an 
“organizational” stopping-rule to add to the individual and group stopping rules discussed above. 
In my own studies, I found that organizational consensus depended more on the management of 
expectations, than upon complex political negotiation. A critical issue of design is how emergent 
problem-structures and their consequent design-goals are communicated to influential 
stakeholders. To frequent a change in design goals and the senior management perception is that 
the design is out of control. Too infrequent a communication and senior management definitions 
of the design problem are dissonant with the design group. The trick appeared to lie in 
communicating problem-structures, rather than solutions (the mobilizing visions discussed 
above). When design objectives were communicated in this way, a new problem-structure could 
be presented as a more developed vision. But when new solutions were presented, senior 
management perceived these as out of alignment with the previous problem-structure. Their 
stopping-rule appeared to be when the group could argue that all elements of the initial solution-
structure (the primary generator) had been covered. 
Synthesis: A MultiLayered Model of Design 
This paper has discussed how IS design operates at multiple levels, in complex organizational 
design environments. This type of  design can be viewed as operating at multiple levels, which 
are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Research Framework for Study of Social Cognition in Boundary-Spanning Design. 
 
Level 
Simon’s 
Process 
Construct 
Replacement Process 
Construct 
Critical Research Questions 
Individual 
Problem-
Solving 
Goal-directed 
problem 
structuring 
and 
decomposition 
Emergent co-evolution 
of problem and 
solution spaces 
How to identify and define emergent design goals. 
Individual stopping rule – appears to be when individual 
understanding of solution for parts of design that are 
understood align with group mobilizing vision (emergent 
problem-structure). 
Group Shared 
cognition, 
equivalent to 
individual 
problem-
solving 
Distributed cognition How collaborative design may be guided and 
coordinated through an interrelated set of exemplars that 
operate at different levels. 
Collective stopping rule – appears to be when three 
conditions are met that permit cognitive division of 
labor. 
Organizational 
context 
Problem-
structures are 
inherent in the 
situation 
Problems are 
interrelated, subjective 
& socially-constructed 
through interaction. 
How to determine and a agree a consensus boundary and 
content for the problem. 
Organizational stopping rule – appears to be when senior 
management convinced that original high-level solution 
elements are explained by a coherent problem-structure. 
The key issue in this discussion is the interrelationship between the three levels. Three different 
types of design “vision” were identified: (i) the high-level model of the system solution that 
provided a unifying primary generator for the group, (ii) the series of mobilizing visions, that 
provided a temporary, unifying problem-structure against which individuals could test their 
detailed understanding of the solution, (iii) the generation of consensus design through the use of 
existing organizational procedures as exemplars for partial solution-abstractions and the 
aggregation of these abstractions into sub-problem areas that could be assigned to individual 
group-members for detailed resolution. The stopping rules appear to be related to the various 
levels of design exemplar and also appear to depend on the coherency of problem-definitions, in 
conditions of organizational complexity. This is in contrast to Simon’s model of design, where 
the stopping-rule is indicated by the satisfaction of pre-determined design goals. 
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